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NOTES
Head 'em Off at the Impasse!: A Victory
for Management in the War to Implement
its "Last Best Offer"
Mountain Valley EducationalAss'n v. Maine SAD No. 43'

I. INTRODUCTION
The impasse doctrine in collective bargaining allows limited unilateral action
by an employer when a good-faith deadlock in negotiations is reached between the
employer and employees' representatives.2 This doctrine is a judicial invention
used to reconcile the dual mandate of the National Labor Relations Act: to enforce
the duty of good-faith bargaining while not compelling parties to accept
agreements or make concessions.' Traditionally, the impasse doctrine has been
viewed as a tool to promote an ongoing bargaining process; more recently, it has
been viewed as a teninal point in the negotiation process.4
By broadening the definition of impasse, courts ascribing to the recent
revision of the impasse doctrine have moved impasse away from its historical role
in an ongoing bargaining system. This liberalization of the impasse doctrine has
increased managerial discretion in the bargaining process by penitting an
6
employer to safely resort to unilateral action in a wider variety of situations.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Mountain Valley Educational Ass'n v. Maine SAD No. 43, Mountain
Valley Education Association ("Association") appealed from a judgment entered
in the Superior Court of Kenebec County, Maine.7 The Superior Court had
affrined a decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board") upholding

1. 655 A.2d 348 (Me. 1995).
2. Peter Guyon Earle, The Impasse Doctrine,64 CHICAGO-KENT L.REv. 407, 407 (1989) (quoting
luck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982)).
3. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 408.
6. Id.
7. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 350.
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Maine School Administrative District Number 43's ("SAD 43") unilateral
implementation of its last best offer on wages and insurance benefits.'
The Association and SAD 43 began negotiations in June, 1990, for an initial
9
contract that would benefit a combined unit of teacher aides and assistants. The
negotiations were protracted with the parties participating in factfinding and three
mediation sessions. 0 Thereafter, the parties submitted several unresolved issues
Following a hearing, the arbitration panel issued a report, on
to arbitration.
July 9, 1992, which made non-binding recommendations on wages, health
insurance, and retirement benefits and imposed a two-year contract term covering
school years 1991-92 and 1992-93.12
In September 1992, SAD 43 sent a proposal on wages and insurance to the
Association.' 3 The terms, although an improvement over previous offers, were
not in complete accord with the arbitrators' recommendations. 4 The parties met
and rejected this proposal and issued counterproposals. 5 In November 1992,
SAD 43 notified the Association of its last best offer on the issues of wages and
insurance. 6 Though the Association immediately filed for mediation, SAD
7
thereafter unilateraly implemented its wage and insurance proposals.
The Association filed a prohibited practice complaint with the Board.'8 In
its complaint, the Association alleged that SAD 43 had violated the Maine
Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law'9 ("Act") by unilaterally
implementing its wage and insurance proposals and by failing to observe the
arbitrators' binding determination on the duration of the agreement."' T h e
Board ruled that SAD 43 did not violate the Act by its unilateral
implementation. 2 The Board further provided, however, that SAD 43 did violate

8. Id.

9. Id. The combined bargaining unit was a consolidation of two previously distinct school
departments within SAD No.43. Pending negotiation of a new agreement, the aides and assistants each
chose, as a group, which parts of pre-existing benefit packages would apply. See Id at 351.
10. Id. at 350.
11. Id. at 350-51. Among the issues submitted included were wages, health insurance benefits,
and contract duration.

12. Id. at 351. Arbitrators cannot, under Maine law, issue binding decisions on the important
subjects of wages, insurance, and pensions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 965(4) (West 1988).
Therefore, any findings on such issues are to be advisory only. Id.
13. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 351.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. Generally, SAD 43's last best offer, as summarized by the Board, fell short of the
arbitrator's recommended resolution in terms of salary increases, the retroactivity of such increases,
and health insurance contributions. See Id. n.2.
17. Id. at 351.

18. Id.
19. Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 961-975 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
20. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 351.
21. Id.
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the Act in its refusal to implement the binding decision of the arbitrator as to
contract duration.22

Following the Board's ruling, the Association filed a petition for review in
the
the Superior Court.23 The Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision,2 and
4
Association appealed this decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
111. LEoAL BACKGROUND

Previous decisions have not precisely defined "impasse" as used in labor law.
Virtually every case on the subject, however, has included good faith bargaining
and futility of further negotiation in their anecdotal treatments of impasse.25 In
1967, the Board attempted to set out an ordered approach to identifying

impasse."
In Taft Broadcasting, the Board enunciated specific factors which would
become the standard the courts looked to when evaluating impasse as a matter of
law.2' The factors include: (1) the bargaining history, (2) the good faith of the
parties in the negotiations, (3) the length of negotiations, (4) the importance of the
issues over which there is disagreement, and (5) the contemporaneous
understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations.2" The second Taft
factor assures the presence of good faith throughout the process. The remaining
factors are intended to inform the court of the futility of further negotiations.29

The Board in Taft applied each of the above-mentioned factors except bargaining
history to determine whether the unilateral changes made by the employer were
acceptable given the existence of impasse.3"

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Ellen J. Dannin, Collective BargainingImpasseand Implementationof FinalOffers: Have We
Createda Right Unaccompaniedby Fulfillment, 19 U. TOL L. REV. 41, 44 (1987); Heller, Unilateral
Action in a Concession Bargaining Context, 35 LAB. L.J. 747, 754 (1984); Terrence H. Murphy,
Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in GoodFaith, U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977); Frank H. Stewart &
William K. Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining andAction, U. CIN. L. REV. 233, 241 (1970).
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962) (providing a straightforward statement of the general
rule of the impasse exception: "unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is.
. . a violation of § 8(a)(5) [of the National Labor Relations Act], for it is a circumvention of the duty
to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal."); Id at 745
(providing an implicit acknowledgment of the impasse exception).
26. Taft Broadcasting, 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enforced sub nom.; American Fed'n of
Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Charles D. Bonnano Linen Serv., 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 454
U.S. 404 (1982); Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984); George Banta Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1197
(1911); Southern Newspapers, 246 N.L.R.B. 39 (1979); Allen W. Bird I, 227 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1357
(1977); Times Herald Printing Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 993, 1003 (1973).
28. Taft, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
29. id.
30. Id. See Earle, supra note 2, at 412 (discussing in detail the facts of Taft).
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Courts have continued to generally apply the Taft factors, even in cases that
appear to move away from the philosophical idea of impasse expressed in Taft and
other decisions of its era. What follows is a brief survey of each factor as applied
in the years between Taft and Mountain Valley.

A. BargainingHistory
Bargaining history has been the least important Taft factor. In Taft, no
indication was made as to the significance of bargaining history in determining
impasse." Although this factor has been commonly listed as a recitation rather
than used as a substantive consideration, the Board has subsequently applied it in
a meaningful and useful way on occasion.
Bargaining history has been effectively used as a means of giving perspective
to the other factors -- especially the "good faith of the parties."3 2 Courts will
assume that parties with an amicable history are more likely to negotiate in good
faith, and inversely, that parties with an acrimonious history are less likely to do
33

so.

Bargaining history has also been used to consider the length of time over
which the parties have negotiated. Parties with a brief history of negotiating are
less likely to have reached a bona fide impasse and more likely to be merely
experiencing the difficulties of a transition.3 4 The substance of the inverse
assumption, however, has been questioned insofar as courts consider the length of
history without considering its nature as discussed in the preceding
a bargaining
35
paragraph.

31. Id. See also, Dahl Fish Co. Seapac, 279 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1986); Coalite, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B.
293, 301-03 (1986); TKB Int'l Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 n.8 (1979).
32. Earle, supranote 2, at 413. One example given by Earle is the decision in Salt River Valley
Water Users Ass'n, 204 N.L.R.B. 83, 87 (1973), wherein the Board noted that the parties long history
of "excellent relations" suggested the absence of bad faith. See also, San Diego Van Storage Co., 236
N.L.R.B. 701 (1978); Times Herald Printing Co., 221 N.LR.B. 225 (1975).
33. There is less case law indicating the converse presumption. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Seattle-First National Bank, 267 N.L.R.B. 897 (1983); Excavation-Constr., 248
N.L.RB. 649, 650, 654 (1980); Alsey Refractories, 215 N.L.R.B. 785 (1974).
35. Earle, supra note 2, at 414 (citing courts "mechanical" application of this factor in Lou
Stecher's Super Markets, 275 N.L.R.B. 475 (1985) and Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984)).
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B. Good Faith
Good faith bargaining is perhaps the single fundamental requirement of the
National Labor Relations Act and is specified in section 8.36 Good faith is
concerned with the intent of the parties to settle or agree rather than to simply try
While good faith alone is not the dispositive
to "wait out" the opposition.
factor in determining impasse, it can fairly be characterized as a prerequisite.
Courts and the Board have pointed to specific conduct which evidences a lack
of good faith in the negotiations: delaying tactics, unreasonable demands, arbitrary
scheduling of meetings, and unilateral action.39 For instance, the Board in M&M
Building & ElectricalService4' cited delaying tactics of the union as justification
for unilateral action by the employer. 4' The "good faith" element of this decision
rests on the party claiming impasse -- the employer. Therefore, the Board noted
that an employer should generally demonstrate its good faith, as opposed to the
union's bad faith, in its attempt to show impasse.42
In Crane Co.,43 the Board held that delaying tactics were of heightened
significance when they occurred toward the end of a contract or at the end of other
limitation periods. 4 Therefore, the context of delaying tactic is of crucial
significance to the issue of good faith.45
Traditionally, courts and the Board have agreed that an employer that has
committed an unfair labor practice and has not remedied that practice could not
invoke the protections of impasse. 46 This prohibition is based on the necessary
failure of good faith in such instances.47 NLRB v. Cauthorne48 is an example
of the recent movement away from this traditional view.

36. See N.L.R.B. v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (1963) (impasse is a deadlock that occurs
"despite the best faith" between parties); Hi-Way Billboards, 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1976) (providing
that "a genuine impasse in negotiations is synonymous with a deadlock: the parties have discussed a
subject of subjects in good faith, and, despite their best efforts to achieve agreement with respect to
such, neither party is willing to move from its respective position."). See also NLRB v. Independent
Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979);
Dallas Gen. Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Excavation-Constr., 248 N.L.R.B.
at 650; Taft, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
37. See NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210,215 (8th Cir. 1965); Akron Novelty Mfg.
Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998, 1001 (1976); Taft, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
38. See Earle, supra note 2, at 415.
39. ACL Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984).
40. 262 N.L.R.B. 1472 (1982).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 244 N.L.R.B. 103 (1979).
44. Id.
45. See Earle, supra note 2, at 416.
46. NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 1977); Hyatt Corp. v. NLRB,
939 F.2d 361, 371 (6th Cir. 1991).
47. C. MoRRIs, Tm DEvELOPING LABOR LAw 637 (2d ed. 1983).
48. 691 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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In Cauthorne, the court acknowledged that although "some evidence
concerning the good faith" of some employer conduct had been presented,
evidence was not dispositive of the good faith factor.49 With this decision, the
court explicitly disavowed any absolute rule denying employers committing unfair
labor practices the benefits of impasse.5 °

In the absence of overt conduct demonstrating a lack of good faith, courts
and the Board have also looked to the substance of the proposals exchangedby the
parties in determining impasse." This branch of good faith analysis, however,

like that of overt acts, seems to have been liberalized in some recent decisions.
For example, in Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB52 the court held that

inferences drawn from the content of the parties' proposals could not be the sole
grounds for a finding of bad faith.53
C. Length of Negotiations
The length of the negotiations is clearly the most empirical of the five Taft

factors.

Not only is the information as to the number and length of actual

meetings easy to collect, but it is also difficult for the parties to distort.14 Length

of negotiations alone, however, has not been a relatively compelling factor to the
Board. The Board has held that this factor does not control the question of
impasse. 5 The random decisions of the Board in negotiations of various lengths

attest to the little weight given to this factor.56

49. Id at 1024-26.
50. See infranotes 58-60. See also Dependable Bldg. Maintenance Co., 276 N.LRB. 27 (1985)
(relying on the court's rule as expressed in Cauthorne);Eagle Express Co., 273 N.LR.B. 501 (1984)
(allowing an employer to implement, under the impasse exception, the wage proposal it had already
unlawfully implemented).
51. The most widely cited case establishing this practice is NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Manufacturing Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). See NLRB v. Wright
Motors, Inc., 603 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1979). See also A-I King Size Sandwiches, Inc. 265
N.L.R1B. 850, 858 (1982); Glenmar Clinestine, Inc., 264 N.LR.B. 236 (1982) (citing Reed & Prince,
205 F.2d at 131).
52. 638 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 1226.
54. See Earle, supra note 2, at 420.
55. See, e.g., Coalite, 278 N.LRB. at 293.
56. See Hamady Bros. Food Mkts., 275 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1985) (impasse after five meetings); Bell
Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984) (impasse after three meetings); Good GMC, Inc., 267 N.LR.B.
583, 585 (1983) (no impasse after two meetings); R-A. Hatch Co., 263 N.LR.B. 1221 (1982) (impasse
after two meetings); Crest Beverage Co., 232 N.L.R.B. 116 (1977), modified, 575 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 1069 (1979) (no impasse after four meetings); Atlas Tack Co., 226
N.L.R.B. 222, 227 (1976) (no impasse after fifteen meetings); Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.LR.B.
998 (1976) (no impasse after eight meetings); Taylor-Winfield Corp., 225 N.LR.B. 457 (1976)
(impasse after eighteen meetings).
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D. The Importance of Issues as to Which There is a Disagreement
The parties must disagree over a "key issue" to validly assert impasse."' In
Taft, the Board held that if a single issue is sufficiently important to the
negotiation, that issue could be the basis of a deadlock.5"
The issue which the parties agree on has also been, and perhaps was always
meant to be, an important consideration under this factor. When determining
whether a sufficient degree of latitude exists for continued bargaining, all issues
on which there is an agreement or continued disagreement may be significant.59
Important issues which the parties agree on are relevant in this factor's analysis
because they offer the parties an opportunity to trade-off and compromise. This
opportunity suggests that ultimate agreement on all issues is more likely."
For example, in Saunders House v. NLRB,6 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the Board's finding that no impasse existed because the
outstanding issues of wages and union security were so important.62 Reaching
a similar decision, the Board in Bell Transit found a valid impasse based on
disagreement over only one issue, wages. 63 This decision, however, has been
criticized as a repudiation of the "Importance" factor and an indication of the trend
toward pro-employer policymaking by the Board.'
E. The Contemporaneous Understandingof the Parties
as to the State of Negotiations
In Taft, the Board applied the contemporaneous understanding factor by
focusing its attention on the parties' last two sessions.65 Based on these last two
sessions, the Board concluded that the parties believed they were further from an
agreement at that point than they were at the beginning of the negotiation.6

57. Dallas Gen., 355 F.2d at 845.
58. 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
59. Earle, supra note 2, at 422.
60. See, e.g., American Fed'n, 395 F.2d at 628; NLRB v. Webb Furniture Corp., 366 F.2d 314,
316 (4th Cir. 1966); Patrick & Co., 248 N.LRB. 390, 393 (1980).
61. 719 F.2d 683, 689 (3d Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 688-89.
63. Bell Transit, 271 N.LRB. at 1272-73.
64. Earle, supra note 2, at 423. In Bell Transit the employer was under significant pressure from
its sole client, a multinational chemical corporation. Bell Transit, 271 N.L.R.B. at 1272-73.
Furthermore, the Board's finding of impasse, albeit based on a disagreement over a single factor, could
be considered consistent with traditional "Importance" analysis because of the extreme importance or
"supremacy of the issue" over which the parties disagreed. Id at 1273.
65. Taft, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. See also Earle, supra note 2, at 424.
66. Taft, 163 N.LR.B. at 478.
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Therefore, a finding of impasse was proper because the parties seemed to have a
contemporaneous understanding that impasse existed.61
The Board has called the contemporaneous understanding factor the most
difficult of the five Taft factors to resolve because it demands objective proof of
subjective facts -- the parties' respective state of mind.' In Inta-Roto, the Board
"objective evidence to warrant a belief that an impasse had
said it would consider
69
been reached."
In Seattle-FirstNational Bank, the Board held that because the employers'
proposals were so onerous, the parties likely knew that agreement to such terms
was virtually impossible.7" The naked use of "impasse" in negotiations alone
does not suggest any contemporaneous understanding between the parties; instead,
the courts and the Board, as in Seattle-FirstNationalBank, look to the substance
of the relationship. 1
In summary, the Board and courts have applied differing standards. Some
have suggested that the underlying principles of impasse as set out in the Taft
factors are under siege. Still, Taft and its five factors remain, in name if no longer
fully in fact, the standard used in determining whether or not impasse exists.

F. Five Factors Under Siege
Two recent federal circuit court decisions demonstrate that the impasse
doctrine is surrounded by increasing tension and is resulting in the reduction of
management's free reign: Toledo Blade Co. v. NLRB1 2 and Colorado-Ute
Electric Ass 'n, Inc. v. NLRB73 . In both cases, the Board and court of appeals
hesitated to find impasse. In Toledo, the court hesitated to find impasse where
management sought to circumvent the traditional duties of union
representatives.74 In Colorado-Ute, the court did not find impasse where
management sought to exercise unfettered discretion in implementing merit pay
increases." In both cases, either the board or the reviewing court chose from the

67. Id.
68. Inta-Roto, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 764 (1980).
69. Id. Presumably, the Board would charge both parties with knowledge of such evidence and
would assume their reasonable assessment of it
70. 267 N.L.R.B. at 898.
71. See T. Marshall Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. 1126 (1986). This case illustrates an instance where the
Board has refused to consider the mere use of the word "impasse" as evidence that the parties
understood impasse to exist or threaten to loom.
72. 295 N.L.R.B. 626 (1989), remanded, 907 F.2d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
73. 295 N.L.R.B. 607, rev'd, 939 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 2300 (1992).
74. Toledo, 907 F.2d at 1224.
75. 939 F.2d at 1397.
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complex issues of the case a single issue which was sufficient to defeat the finding
of impasse. 6

Toledo and Colorado-Ute, however, involved questions of law where the
most significant abrogation of labor rights under impasses seems to have arisen
from the Board's factfinding activities (or lack thereof), rather than its legal
analysis. For this reason, the labor victories won in Toledo and Colorado-Ute may
appear hollow to those concerned about the future integrity of the impasse
doctrine.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. The Impasse Exception and State Labor Law
In Mountain Valley EducationalAss'n v. Maine SAD No. 43, the courtbegan
its analysis by reaffirming the general rule followed in Maine and federal courts
that prevents either party in a labor negotiation from unilaterally implementing
changes in prevailing wages, hours, or working conditions." The court continued

to explain that such a proscription "[prevents a private employer] from'going over
the head' of the bargaining agent by unilaterally" manipulating wages or other
benefits.7" Instead, the parties must maintain the status quo while bargaining,

regardless of whether they are bargaining over a new contract, a contract renewal,
or a contract modification. 9 The court also demonstrated the applicability of the
general rule to public sector bargaining in the state of Maine. 0
After setting out the general rule against unilateral implementation, the court
raised the impasse exception as adopted in Maine.8 The court said that this
exception allows a party to unilaterally implement its last best offer when
negotiations have reached a bona fide impasse.' This exception, the court noted,
does not end the duty to bargain in good faith, but instead, merely suspends such
duty until changed circumstances indicate that impasse no longer exists.8 3
The court identified one difference between Maine law and the federal
impasse exception: Impasse cannot occur as a matter of law until the parties have

76. See, 1d; Toledo, 902 F.2d at 1224.
77. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 351 (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190,
198 (1991); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964
F.2d 1153, 1157, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
78. Id. at 351-52.
79. Id. at 352 (citing Litton, 501 U.S. at 198).
80. Id. (citing Lane v. Board of Dir. of Me. Sch. Admin. Dist No. 8, 447 A.2d 806, 809-10 (Me.
1982); State v. Maine Labor Relations Bd., 413 A.2d 510, 515 (Me. 1980)).
81. Id. (citing Maine Labor Relations, 413 A.2d at 510).
82. Id. (citing Litton, 501 U.S. at 198; McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d at 1157, 1164-65).
83. Id. (citing McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d at 1164-65).
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completed a protocol of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes.'

The

rationale for this additional element of impasse lies in the restrictions Maine places
on its public employees.85 Unlike private employees, Maine public employees

do not have the right to strike.'

The court reasoned that since the law eliminates

the most common form of employee impasse resolution, the legislature added to
the duty of good-faith bargaining the burden of completing the ADR regimen. 87

This addition offsets the union's right with a burden most often borne by
management.'
The court appeared to support the holding of the Maine Labor Relations

Board that unilateral implementation prior to completion of the statutory ADR
regimen would be a per se violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.' In
reality, however, the court focused its analysis in Mountain Valley on whether the
Act permits an employer to unilaterally implement a last best offer after
completion of said ADR procedures, and if so, when?"o The court first dismissed
the argument raised by the Association to abandon the impasse exception
altogether." The court stated that although the parties can agree to resolve issues
of wages and insurance by binding arbitration, they should never be compelled to

do so.92 Such compulsion would rob the parties of the important power not to
agree and, in this case, would undermine government control of the public
finances.93

Next, the Association raised a similar argument that a unilateral
implementation, whether under the auspices of impasse or otherwise, contradicts
the Act's policy that "neither side shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or be

84. Id. This protocol includes the obligation to participate in mediation, factfinding, and
arbitration. Arbitration, traditionally the final step in the process, is binding on all except the most
crucial subjects: wages, insurance and pensions. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL26, § 965(4) (West
1988).
85. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 351.
86. Id (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964(2)(C) (West 1988)).
87. Id
88. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(4) (West 1988)). For example, the instant
case involved SAD 43 making a series of concessions. Because this process of concession is not
commonly the role of management, unilateral implementation of the last best offer (which effectively
halts this process of conceding) is commonly the tool of management, not labor. Id
The court acknowledged that though the limitation that the ADR requirement never binds either
party serves to pressure the employer to bargain, it stops short of usurping traditional public
prerogatives over management of public organizations and finances. Id (quoting Raymond G. Maguire
& Bryan M. Dench, Public Employee BargainingUnder the MaineMunicipalPublicEmployees Labor
Relations Law: The First Five Years, 27 ME. L REV. 107, 115 (1975)).
89. See Id.
90. Id
91. Id at 353.
92. Id
93. Id
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required to make concession." 94 The court distinguished what the Association
contended was the practical effect of such unilateral action from the legal
philosophy underlying the exception. The court stated, "The association confuses
the making of a contract with the unilateral implementation of a last best offer
during a period in which no contract exists. 9 5 (emphasis added). While
admitting that the unilateral action of SAD 43 had created a new "status quo" from
which negotiations would begin upon the end of the impasse, the court refused to
equate this new "status quo" with the imposition of a final contract. 96 Rather, the
court considered it to be only a temporary measure.'
The court continued to hold that the Act differs from the National Labor
Relations Act in one respect - its prohibition of strikes.98 Therefore, it is not
appropriate to argue that the other elements of the federal version of the Act are
inapplicable." Specifically, the court held that the impasse exception in the
federal law should survive the National Labor Relations Act's translation into the
laws of Maine.'"
B. The Board's Finding of Impasse
Having generally affirmed the continued recognition of the impasse exception
as an element of Maine law, the court next reviewed the Board's specific finding
of impasse in the instant case.'01
The Association claimed that the Board's findings should be reversed under
the Act because the Board failed to support its finding of impasse with substantial
recorded evidence." °2 The court responded to this claim by stating that:
the Board was not required to make express findings that further
negotiations would be fruitless. The parties here had completed
mediation, factflnding, and arbitration... the Board [also] concluded
that SAD 43 had participated in further negotiation for a reasonable
period of time after receiving the arbitration report .... We find the

94. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(C) (West 1988)). The Association cited
the court's decision in Caribou Sch. Dep't v. Caribou Teachers Ass'n, 402 A.2d 1279 (Me. 1979) in
which the court afftirmed the Board's inability to impose wage terms on parties.
95. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 353.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id at 354.
102. Id (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 968(5)(F) (West 1988); Saunders, 719 F.2d at
687-88, cert denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984)).
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Board's findings on impasse to be supported by substantial evidence on
the record. 3
In addition to the court's finding of the above-quoted evidence of statutory
compliance, the court cautioned that it stood in a poor position to review the
Board's factfinding.'0 4 The Board,'the court reasoned, was far "better suited"
to evaluate complex issues of industrial relations.'0 °
The court concluded its analysis by affirming the Board's decision on
contract duration.1" 6 This court affirmed the Board's decision despite the
Board's finding that SAD 43 violated the Act by failing to implement the binding
decision of the arbitrator, and it did not remedy this violation before it allowed
SAD 43 to unilaterally implement its last best offer."1 Noting the broad
discretion of the Board in remedying violations of the Act, the Court affirmed.'0 8

C. Judge Lipez's Dissent
Judge Lipez wrote in opposition to the majority because he feared the court
had tacitly adopted the concept of "statutory impasse."'"
The concept of
statutory impasse reasons that impasse is the result of a mechanical completion of
the ADR protocol set forth in ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965, and not
necessarily the result of any actual breakdown in negotiations," 0 The majority
in this case did not cite any evidence that negotiations had in fact broken down,
but instead, focused on the parties' completion of various procedures."'
Judge Lipez noted that an affirmative finding "that further bargaining would
be futile" is central to finding impasse." 2 Lipez contended that the facts3 of the
instant case revealed "an ongoing process" as opposed to a "deadlock.""
Lipez argued that the court should insist on a rigorous review before
acknowledging the existence of impasse because unilateral implementation of any
kind conflicts with the very concept of collective bargaining and because of the
inherent advantage given to employers under the impasse doctrine. 4 He warned

103. Id. It should also be noted that the court did not mention any findings by the Board as to
the quality or nature of relations between the Association and SAD 43 at the time of unilateral
implementation. The court also did not mention that such findings needed to be made.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id (Lipez, I., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. (citing Alsey Refractories Co., 215 N.LR.B. 146 (1974). See James W. Heller,
Unilateral Action in a Concession Bargaining Context, 35 LAB. LJ. 747, 754 (1984)).
113. Id. at 355.
114. Id.
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that the "diluted impasse standard" adopted by the majority will compromise the
effectiveness rather than endorse the importance of impasse resolution procedures
mandated by statute.'" This compromise will stem from the ease of unilateral
implementation that an employer will see at the end of the ADR process." 6
Lipez argued that the majority's opinion has vitiated the rule that unilateral
implementation of the last best offer prior to completion of requested impasse
resolution procedures shall per se violate ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
964(l)(E)' and that the majority opinion has 8also weakened "the fundamental
tenets of fairness in public sector bargaining."
Lipez then demonstrated the flaws in the majority's holding by considering
the facts of the instant case." 9 He noted that, inter alia, on October 13,
1992,120 the parties had met and resolved the retirement benefits issue. 12 In
addition to agreeing on retirement benefits, the Association made corrections and
additions to a working draft of a final agreement and presented counterproposals
to SAD 43's last best offer.'22 Lipez argued that these facts revealed that at the
time SAD 43 unilaterally imposed its last best offer, the two-year negotiation
process was nearing an independent, consensual resolution, rather than hopeless
deadlock.12
Citing Sanford Firefighters, Lipez set out the factors to be considered in
evaluating impasse: (1) the progress parties were making in negotiations, (2) the
issues remaining to be resolved, (3) whether the parties had met to resolve the
remaining issues, and (4) whether24the non-declaring party had been consulted
regarding declaration of impasse.
In addition, Lipez pointed out that the majority had not considered SAD 43's
refusal to honor the binding decision of the arbitrator regarding contract
duration. 2 ' Lipez claims that this refusal "unmistakably contributed to the
inability of the parties to resolve their differences during the post-arbitration

115. Id.
116. Id
117. This provision of the Maine code sets out the general duty to bargain in good faith.
118. Id.
119. Id
120. The last best offer was unilaterally implemented on November 20, 1992 -- just over a month
after what Judge Lipez apparently considered significant progress in the negotiations.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Lipez noted, however, the remaining differences between the parties at the end of the
October 1992, negotiating session which included health insurance coverage, the retroactive effective
date of wage increases for year one, and a difference of ten cents in wage levels for year two. Id
124. Id. at 356.
125. Id.
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other than a good faith failure to agree
period" and, therefore, indicated something
6
-something other than impasse.1
Noting that each Sanford factor in the instant case suggested that impasse did
not exist and noting the existence of affinnative evidence of bad faith by the party
claiming impasse, Lipez worried that the majority's decision21 7given these facts
raises the possibility of a statutory impasse regime in Maine.
V. COMMENT

The majority's decision in Mountain Valley EducationalAss'n v. Maine SAD
No. 43 raises general concerns about the continuing erosion of labor rights under
the impasse exception and specific concerns about the potential for misapplying
statutory ADR protocols as a new means of negotiation.
A. ProtectingManagement through Impasse
The final stop in the movement away from the traditional impasse standards
embodied in Taft Broadcastinghas arguably created a system which distorts the
ideals and policies embodied in collective bargaining. 25 The playing field on
which both sides of a labor negotiation pursue their interests has been severely
slanted in favor of management through the fortification of managment's rights
under impasse. 29 Some argue that a union representative attempting to satisfy
constituents' diverse needs must negotiate in this system where there are no firm
guidelines or guidelines which provide only illusory support. 30
To describe this development as simple pro-management activism, however,
would be incorrect. The recent decisions of the Board regarding impasse do not
defer to management as much as they fail to uphold any traditional standard of fair
dealing. In essence, these decisions encourage lawlessness.' 3'
In the absence of legal safeguards, naked capitalism tends to favor ownership
in these situations for two reasons. First, corporate ownership ultimately "brought
the ball" by founding the business, and it can choose to discontinue business

126. Id.Lipez quotes a legal scholar here: "The impasse exception to the unilateral action
proscription goes hand in hand with good faith. Absent good faith bargaining, there can be no
impasse." James W. Weller, UnilateralAction in a Concession Bargaining Context, 35 LAB. IJ. 747,
754 (1984).
127. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 356.
128. See Dannin, supra note 25, at 65.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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altogether.'3 2 Second, corporate owners are generally less dependant upon
regular income for their day-to-day existence. A dividend that has been delayed
for the purpose of resolving a troublesome labor dispute can be forborne more
easily than a paycheck which is missed and will never arrive due to a work
stoppage.
The lawlessness descends upon the process as the Board abdicates its role as
factfinder in cases of impasse in favor of increased deferenceto the party asserting
impasse. 33 Mountain Valley symbolizes this system of increased deference. In
this case, the court affirmed the impasse in the absence of any affirnative
negotiation and the parties'
evidence thereof, excepting the length of 3 the
4
completion of the statutory scheme of ADR.1
Those commentators who have most vigorously asserted the Board's failure
to preserve the integrity of the impasse doctrine seem to improperly extend their
argument beyond the law and into the realm of economic policy. For example,
Ms. Dannin notes:
Employers have a great deal of power at the best of times to determine
the conditions of the workplace. In times of economic downturn that
power increases as unions and employees are cowed by fear of
unemployment . . . . At the same time unions are weakened as a
consequence of economic disasters on their membership. '
This kind of rhetoric seems to suggest not only that the Board should return
to close scrutiny of the facts of labor negotiations, but also that such scrutiny
should extend to the substance of those negotiations. Only this kind of judicial
interventionism would sufficiently allay such concerns about theperilous economic
challenges facing labor today, Such interventionism, however, goes far beyond
the task of rational factfmding.
Notwithstanding philosophical disagreements, it should also
that is becoming
be noted that other lawyers have discussed an impasse doctrine
13 6
less clearly deferential to management, if not less vague.

132. The colloquial phrase "brought the ball" refers to universal truths of power and influence on
the playground. Should a game break down due to an unresolved controversy (a grade school
"impasse"), ultimate power rests in the child who brought the ball. He is the only one who cannot be
cut out of the bargaining lest he pick up his ball and go home.
133. This movement away from close scntiny of facts surrounding impasse is discussed and
documented more fully in the Legal Background Section of this note. See supra part III.
134. Mountain Valley, 655 A.2d at 354. See supra text accompanying note 102.
135. See Dannin, supra note 25, at 67.
136. Joseph J. Costello & Stacy K. Weinberg, Toledo Blade And Colorado-Ute: When is
Bargainingto Impasse Not Enough?, 9 LAB. LAW. 127 (1993).
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B. Distortingthe Goals of Alternate Dispute Resolution
Ex ante ADR policies 37 may be adopted because they are generally of
mutual benefit to contracting parties or parties who have some other
relationship. 3 ' These mutual benefits include reduced costs because of less
formal, extra-judicial procedures which call for less legal advice and expense. 39
Another benefit generally ascribed to ADR procedures is the less adversarial, and
as a result, less acrimonious environment these procedures create. Such
cooperative systems can be less deleterious to an ongoing professional or
commercial relationship than the grind of litigation. 4 Consider the opinion of
one ADR expert who stated that "[fjiling a lawsuit can indeed be a hostile act.
Our expression 'to be slapped with a lawsuit' or 'hit with a lawsuit' conveys the
sense of combat and aggressiveness inherent in legal action.""' ADR, on the
other hand, offers the absence of fault-finding, plus the experience of working
with one's opponent toward a settlement.'42 Such practices serve to "save face"
for both parties and help to preserve the relationship.' 43
The idea of ADR as a collective, cooperative means of saving money and
reducing animosity between disputants has been turned on its head in Mountain
Valley. ADR can become simply another way to bury your opponents' lawyer
with paperwork and pre-trial obligations. Since neither the Board nor the court
will inquire into the actual substance of the mediation, arbitration, or factfinding
process, a party who has resolved that its position shall prevail has no incentive
to work cooperatively. The fact that the locus of the conflict is a mediation clinic
or a lawyer's office instead of a courtroom cannot in and of itself derail the
conflict.
In the informal land of out-of-court mediation, no judge is available to
compel discovery or to threaten to hold the party in contempt.' The absence
of a judge can be liberating or comforting to parties who have chosen ADR. In
compulsory ADR schemes like that ordered by the Maine Act, however, the
judge's absence can simply cause the dispute to enter
the court system when one
45
disputant senses the need for the power of a court.
This lack of an authoritative third party limits ADR by its very definition.
Decisions such as Mountain Valley, however, imply that parties cannot resort to
an authoritative third party even when proceeding in court. This "lawless"

137. Ex ante policies provide for ADR before disputes arise. The policy set by Maine statute in
Mountain Valley was such a policy.
138. STEVEN SHAVEIJ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ANECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1992).
139. Id.
140. Id
141. PETER LOVENEImm, MEDIATE, DON'T LMr.ATE 22 (1989).
142. Id
143. Id.
144. Edward Brunet,Questioning the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL L REV.
1,41 (1987).
145. See Id.
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deference to a party's invocation of impasse allows the cooperative spirit which
gave rise to ADR protocols to be vitiated by those unwilling to bargain in good
faith. Ironically, these ADR processes which have been implementedto encourage
understanding and cooperation between parties in dispute have been transformed
into a means by which powerful management negotiators can dictate their terms.
The court in Mountain Valley refused to acknowledge that even a long
negotiation which included ADR is useless absent good faith and, therefore, no
indication of a legitimate impasse according to Taft. Instead, the court allowed
such superficial considerations to legally define the underlying substance of the
negotiation. In cases where such outward appearances belie a lack of impasse
within, courts will misread impasse and allow a last best offer to be wrongly thrust
upon one party. Whether this was the case or not in Mountain Valley is unclear.
This uncertainty, which is the result of inadequate factfinding throughout the
judicial process, should be of greatest concern to those who wish to see fair
treatment of both parties to a labor negotiation.

VI. CONCLUSION
The reluctance of courts to unduly interfere in the private negotiations
between labor and management is based upon the noble idea that courts should
react to disputes rather than institute their own theory on how to avoid them. In
the courts' abdication of any real factflnding standards for establishing the
existence of impasse, however, courts like the Maine Supreme Court in Mountain
Valley have restricted labor negotiators in their attempts to liberalize the process.
Instead, courts should resolve to establish factfinding standards that allow them to
find impasse only when the external indicia of impasse truly demonstrate a
hopeless deadlock. Such a resolution will certainly require a more rigorous
analysis of private negotiations. The alternative to this rigorous analysis is a
regime in which heavy-handed employers, not the courts, hold the power to
determine the existence of impasse. Courts should resist this preference for might

over right.
THOMAS C. ALBus
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